by clicking the arrows at the side of the page, or by using the toolbar.
by clicking anywhere on the page.
by dragging the page around when zoomed in.
by clicking anywhere on the page when zoomed in.
web sites or send emails by clicking on hyperlinks.
Email this page to a friend
Search this issue
Index - jump to page or section
Archive - view past issues
Maritime Logistics Community News : Summer 2010
35 NAVY SUPPLY NEWSLETTER SUMMER 2010 6. Of course COLLINS and FSM are not SSNs. Nonetheless their complexity, and strategic importance, is arguably greater than that of any other asset in the ADF inventory. Uniquely among non-nuclear submarines, COLLINS was developed to operate at longer ranges and have greater endurance than that of contemporary diesel electric boats, its role more akin to that of an SSN. As such, greater logistic autonomy and reliability would be important considerations for the delivery of Operational Capability. However, given the enhanced oceanic role of COLLINS, and eventually FSM, over and above the traditional employment of short range low endurance submarines developed for localised conflicts in the European theatre, it would be reasonable to adduce that employing a complemented pre-Charge qualified Supply Officer in an Australian submarine would not be incongruous given the experiences of both the USN and RN. This has now proven to be a necessity due to the well documented deficiencies and ultimately the recommendation of the Reference in the management of logistic issues in Australian submarines. A complemented SO(SM) would provide a continuity of logistic support for the submarine when at sea; bridging that provided from external agencies and providing a conduit for feedback and reporting purposes including mandatory compliance and governance requirements. Moreover as encountered in the USN and RN models, non-Supply personnel are less inclined, given their other important responsibilities, to pursue logistics issues with the same tenacity or accountability that would be expected from a logistic specialist and as such are harder to hold to account for matters that in most part they lack the training and experience to satisfactorily manage. 7. As a comparator the following information is presented as evidence of the under investment in at sea COLLINS's support. Key points to note are that COLLINS has: a. The Fleet's longest duration independent patrol requirement (70 days); b. The Fleet's largest spares outfit (by value -- $15M); and c. Nil onboard stock management expertise, until May 2010 when the LSSN was introduced. d. Nil onboard Inventory Management System (IMS), until May 2010 when the LSSN was introduced. CONCEPT OF EMPLOYMENT 8. The challenge for the RAN's Submarine and Supply Communities is to acknowledge that a SO(SM) will have watchkeeping and whole ship responsibilities as well as discharging their Supply duties onboard; and balancing both roles will need careful management. This is how both the USN and RN have successfully operated for the past 40 years. It is impractical to propose that the SO(SM) would be excluded from a watchkeeping role. There are insufficient personnel for this to be workable and it could prove invidious amongst the ship's company were a non- watchkeeping officer complemented onboard. Moreover it is important from a cultural change perspective to ensure that the SO(SM) is accepted onboard as a member of the crew. Respecting the contribution of the SO(SM) onboard, by the submarine community, will transcend not only 1 The way that materiel support has been provided in the past has been influenced by the number of foreign designed and constructed warships in the Fleet. These major combatants were acquired with a support package provided by the ship's 'Parent Navy'. The "self-reliance" based approach to the development of new and replacement capabilities, commencing with the Collins and Anzac Projects, and migrated to the newer capabilities, requires the majority of support activities to be conducted without the assistance of a 'Parent Navy' -- CDRE Lemon DGMS Maritime Systems Division Instruction, Integrated Materiel Support, Logistics, Version 1 dated 27 July 2004 2 Presented to the Supply Advisory Council by CMDR A.R. Nelson RAN, November 2009. Comparison of key Self Accounting Units (SAU) with Non-Self Accounting Units -- Asset Management and Value2 Unit SN SO IMS # Line GFE/CFE Secure Operating Manning Manning Items Value $m Storerooms Patrol (days) FFH PO LCDR 2xLS LEUT SLIMS 12494 9.06 Yes 25-45 2xAB SBLT FFG CPO LCDR PO LEUT SLIMS 8000 10.00 Yes 25-42 2xLS 2xAB AO CPO LCDR UK (CFE LS SBLT SLIMS 4228 not costed) Yes 42 AB CCSM LSSN NIL SLIMS 3500 15.00 No 70 HS LS SBLT/LEUT AMPS 1500 1.24 Yes 21 PA MHC LS Nil AMPS 500 1.40 Yes 14 PA ACPB 0 Nil Nil 800 0.70 Yes 28 SML 0 Nil Nil 600 0.43 Yes 7 LCH LS Nil Nil 700 0.08 Yes 14 Continued next page ...